

Major Incidents Summary

Outage	Date	Description	Learning and mitigating action
Telephony	August 2016 (Bank Holiday)	<p>A hardware component (hard drive) failed in the legacy telephony system. The configuration inherited by the shared IT Service was not resilient and the failure rendered the telephony system inoperable.</p> <p>Third party support was needed to supply a replacement component and assist with restoration of the service. The support organisation met their contractual obligations and supported the shared IT Service across the Bank Holiday weekend.</p> <p>Telephony Services were largely restored by the Tuesday morning, with any residual issues being resolved over the following two days. The total disruption to telephony services spanned 2.5 working days.</p>	<p>Restoration of the service took longer than expected due to an ineffective backup strategy, which, once identified, was remedied immediately.</p> <p>In February 2019 the shared IT Service was able to finalise the safe exit from the unsatisfactory legacy networking and telephony contract . This enabled the implementation of better performing, more resilient, and more cost effective telephony arrangements across the Partnership.</p> <p>There may be further opportunities to enhance the resilience of telephony system due to the new arrangements and these are now being explored.</p>
Power Failure	May 2017 (Local Election)	<p>The main supply of power to Stevenage was disrupted for approximately 30 minutes before 8am, which affected both Daneshill House and Cavendish Road sites.</p>	<p>Improvement of the environmental controls at both Daneshill House and Cavendish Road sites had already been identified as a priority with funding agreed in the</p>

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		<p>The environmental measures in place were unable to sustain power at either site, resulting in the uncontrolled shutdown of the IT Infrastructure making all IT services unavailable.</p> <p>Recovery of key IT services was achieved by midday, with all services being restored before the end of the day.</p>	<p>17/18 Capital programme.</p> <p>A new generator is in the process of being commissioned at Daneshill House to support the Data Centre in the event of future power disruption, along with new Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) devices at both sites, and improved maintenance regimes to ensure these measures will be effective when required.</p>
<p>Fibre Break</p>	<p>August 2017 (Bank Holiday)</p>	<p>The fibre cable that connects Daneshill House and Cavendish Road sites was severed by a third part on a Saturday morning resulting in the failure of all IT services.</p> <p>The Out of Hours IT service was not designed or expected to recover from this type of issue. A small number of staff attempted to progress the recovery across the Bank Holiday weekend, but it wasn't until Monday that significant progress was made when more staff were available.</p>	<p>The current design of the Councils' IT infrastructure relies on the connectivity between the Daneshill House and Cavendish Road sites to be available. This is an inherent weakness of the design, which is difficult to mitigate cost effectively due to the high specification of the link required.</p> <p>An alternative design has been identified to mitigate the risk associated with the connectivity, which requires investment to replace end-of-life storage devices.</p>

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		<p>Recovery officially commenced at 8am on Tuesday morning, with services being fully restored by 1pm on Wednesday.</p>	<p>This new design only relies on the connectivity to replicate data, rather than to maintain the operation of IT services. Funding to do this has been agreed as part of the existing Capital programme and the final elements of due diligence are being undertaken before procuring the new storage devices.</p> <p>The new design also appears to make it affordable to procure a second line between the sites, which further limits the impact if the connectivity is disrupted again in the future.</p>
<p>Email Outage</p>	<p>March 2018</p>	<p>Email services were disrupted due to a change in network topology resulting from the closure of the Hertford Data Centre. It was not possible to simply reverse this change without the risk of further disruption to other IT services.</p> <p>Email services were restored within 1 working day and no data was lost.</p>	<p>Closing a Data Centre is an atypical activity, so the likelihood for reoccurrence of a similar issue is low.</p> <p>Disruption to services is always a risk when making significant IT change. The control processes were followed correctly on this occasion, but the issue was unforeseen.</p>